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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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* maint-2.22: (43 commits)
Git 2.22.2
Git 2.21.1
mingw: sh arguments need quoting in more circumstances
mingw: fix quoting of empty arguments for `sh`
mingw: use MSYS2 quoting even when spawning shell scripts
mingw: detect when MSYS2's sh is to be spawned more robustly
t7415: drop v2.20.x-specific work-around
Git 2.20.2
t7415: adjust test for dubiously-nested submodule gitdirs for v2.20.x
Git 2.19.3
Git 2.18.2
Git 2.17.3
Git 2.16.6
test-drop-caches: use `has_dos_drive_prefix()`
Git 2.15.4
Git 2.14.6
mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives"
mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters
unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors
...
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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* maint-2.21: (42 commits)
Git 2.21.1
mingw: sh arguments need quoting in more circumstances
mingw: fix quoting of empty arguments for `sh`
mingw: use MSYS2 quoting even when spawning shell scripts
mingw: detect when MSYS2's sh is to be spawned more robustly
t7415: drop v2.20.x-specific work-around
Git 2.20.2
t7415: adjust test for dubiously-nested submodule gitdirs for v2.20.x
Git 2.19.3
Git 2.18.2
Git 2.17.3
Git 2.16.6
test-drop-caches: use `has_dos_drive_prefix()`
Git 2.15.4
Git 2.14.6
mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives"
mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters
unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors
quote-stress-test: offer to test quoting arguments for MSYS2 sh
...
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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These patches fix several bugs in quoting arguments when spawning shell
scripts on Windows.
Note: these bugs are Windows-only, as we have to construct a command
line for the process-to-spawn, unlike Linux/macOS, where `execv()`
accepts an already-split command line.
Furthermore, these fixes were not included in the CVE-2019-1350 part of
v2.14.6 because the Windows-specific quoting when spawning shell scripts
was contributed from Git for Windows into Git only in the v2.21.x era.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Previously, we failed to quote characters such as '*', '(' and the
likes. Let's fix this.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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This reverts the work-around that was introduced just for the v2.20.x
release train in "t7415: adjust test for dubiously-nested submodule
gitdirs for v2.20.x"; It is not necessary for v2.21.x.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When constructing command-lines to spawn processes, it is an unfortunate
but necessary decision to quote arguments differently: MSYS2 has
different dequoting rules (inherited from Cygwin) than the rest of
Windows.
To accommodate that, Git's Windows compatibility layer has two separate
quoting helpers, one for MSYS2 (which it uses exclusively when spawning
`sh`) and the other for regular Windows executables.
The MSYS2 one had an unfortunate bug where a `,` somehow slipped in,
instead of the `;`. As a consequence, empty arguments would not be
enclosed in a pair of double quotes, but the closing double quote was
skipped.
Let's fix this.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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At the point where `mingw_spawn_fd()` is called, we already have a full
path to the script interpreter in that scenario, and we pass it in as
the executable to run, while the `argv` reflect what the script should
receive as command-line.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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* maint-2.20: (36 commits)
Git 2.20.2
t7415: adjust test for dubiously-nested submodule gitdirs for v2.20.x
Git 2.19.3
Git 2.18.2
Git 2.17.3
Git 2.16.6
test-drop-caches: use `has_dos_drive_prefix()`
Git 2.15.4
Git 2.14.6
mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives"
mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters
unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors
quote-stress-test: offer to test quoting arguments for MSYS2 sh
t6130/t9350: prepare for stringent Win32 path validation
quote-stress-test: allow skipping some trials
quote-stress-test: accept arguments to test via the command-line
tests: add a helper to stress test argument quoting
mingw: fix quoting of arguments
Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories
...
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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In v2.15.4, we started to reject `submodule.update` settings in
`.gitmodules`. Let's raise a BUG if it somehow still made it through
from anywhere but the Git config.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
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In v2.20.x, Git clones submodules recursively by first creating the
submodules' gitdirs and _then_ "updating" the submodules. This can lead
to the situation where the clone path is taken because the directory
(while it exists already) is not a git directory, but then the clone
fails because that gitdir is unexpectedly already a directory.
This _also_ works around the vulnerability that was fixed in "Disallow
dubiously-nested submodule git directories", but it produces a different
error message than the one expected by the test case, therefore we
adjust the test case accordingly.
Note: as the two submodules "race each other", there are actually two
possible error messages, therefore we have to teach the test case to
expect _two_ possible (and good) outcomes in addition to the one it
expected before.
Note: this workaround is only necessary for the v2.20.x release train;
The behavior changed again in v2.21.x so that the original test case's
expectations are met again.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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* maint-2.19: (34 commits)
Git 2.19.3
Git 2.18.2
Git 2.17.3
Git 2.16.6
test-drop-caches: use `has_dos_drive_prefix()`
Git 2.15.4
Git 2.14.6
mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives"
mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters
unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors
quote-stress-test: offer to test quoting arguments for MSYS2 sh
t6130/t9350: prepare for stringent Win32 path validation
quote-stress-test: allow skipping some trials
quote-stress-test: accept arguments to test via the command-line
tests: add a helper to stress test argument quoting
mingw: fix quoting of arguments
Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories
protect_ntfs: turn on NTFS protection by default
path: also guard `.gitmodules` against NTFS Alternate Data Streams
...
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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* maint-2.18: (33 commits)
Git 2.18.2
Git 2.17.3
Git 2.16.6
test-drop-caches: use `has_dos_drive_prefix()`
Git 2.15.4
Git 2.14.6
mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives"
mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters
unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors
quote-stress-test: offer to test quoting arguments for MSYS2 sh
t6130/t9350: prepare for stringent Win32 path validation
quote-stress-test: allow skipping some trials
quote-stress-test: accept arguments to test via the command-line
tests: add a helper to stress test argument quoting
mingw: fix quoting of arguments
Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories
protect_ntfs: turn on NTFS protection by default
path: also guard `.gitmodules` against NTFS Alternate Data Streams
is_ntfs_dotgit(): speed it up
...
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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* maint-2.17: (32 commits)
Git 2.17.3
Git 2.16.6
test-drop-caches: use `has_dos_drive_prefix()`
Git 2.15.4
Git 2.14.6
mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives"
mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters
unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors
quote-stress-test: offer to test quoting arguments for MSYS2 sh
t6130/t9350: prepare for stringent Win32 path validation
quote-stress-test: allow skipping some trials
quote-stress-test: accept arguments to test via the command-line
tests: add a helper to stress test argument quoting
mingw: fix quoting of arguments
Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories
protect_ntfs: turn on NTFS protection by default
path: also guard `.gitmodules` against NTFS Alternate Data Streams
is_ntfs_dotgit(): speed it up
mingw: disallow backslash characters in tree objects' file names
...
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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This allows hosting providers to detect whether they are being used
to attack users using malicious 'update = !command' settings in
.gitmodules.
Since ac1fbbda2013 (submodule: do not copy unknown update mode from
.gitmodules, 2013-12-02), in normal cases such settings have been
treated as 'update = none', so forbidding them should not produce any
collateral damage to legitimate uses. A quick search does not reveal
any repositories making use of this construct, either.
Reported-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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* maint-2.16: (31 commits)
Git 2.16.6
test-drop-caches: use `has_dos_drive_prefix()`
Git 2.15.4
Git 2.14.6
mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives"
mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters
unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors
quote-stress-test: offer to test quoting arguments for MSYS2 sh
t6130/t9350: prepare for stringent Win32 path validation
quote-stress-test: allow skipping some trials
quote-stress-test: accept arguments to test via the command-line
tests: add a helper to stress test argument quoting
mingw: fix quoting of arguments
Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories
protect_ntfs: turn on NTFS protection by default
path: also guard `.gitmodules` against NTFS Alternate Data Streams
is_ntfs_dotgit(): speed it up
mingw: disallow backslash characters in tree objects' file names
path: safeguard `.git` against NTFS Alternate Streams Accesses
...
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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This is a companion patch to 'mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives"':
use the DOS drive prefix handling that is already provided by
`compat/mingw.c` (and which just learned to handle non-alphabetical
"drive letters").
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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* maint-2.15: (29 commits)
Git 2.15.4
Git 2.14.6
mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives"
mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters
unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors
quote-stress-test: offer to test quoting arguments for MSYS2 sh
t6130/t9350: prepare for stringent Win32 path validation
quote-stress-test: allow skipping some trials
quote-stress-test: accept arguments to test via the command-line
tests: add a helper to stress test argument quoting
mingw: fix quoting of arguments
Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories
protect_ntfs: turn on NTFS protection by default
path: also guard `.gitmodules` against NTFS Alternate Data Streams
is_ntfs_dotgit(): speed it up
mingw: disallow backslash characters in tree objects' file names
path: safeguard `.git` against NTFS Alternate Streams Accesses
clone --recurse-submodules: prevent name squatting on Windows
is_ntfs_dotgit(): only verify the leading segment
...
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Since ac1fbbda2013 (submodule: do not copy unknown update mode from
.gitmodules, 2013-12-02), Git has been careful to avoid copying
[submodule "foo"]
update = !run an arbitrary scary command
from .gitmodules to a repository's local config, copying in the
setting 'update = none' instead. The gitmodules(5) manpage documents
the intention:
The !command form is intentionally ignored here for security
reasons
Unfortunately, starting with v2.20.0-rc0 (which integrated ee69b2a9
(submodule--helper: introduce new update-module-mode helper,
2018-08-13, first released in v2.20.0-rc0)), there are scenarios where
we *don't* ignore it: if the config store contains no
submodule.foo.update setting, the submodule-config API falls back to
reading .gitmodules and the repository-supplied !command gets run
after all.
This was part of a general change over time in submodule support to
read more directly from .gitmodules, since unlike .git/config it
allows a project to change values between branches and over time
(while still allowing .git/config to override things). But it was
never intended to apply to this kind of dangerous configuration.
The behavior change was not advertised in ee69b2a9's commit message
and was missed in review.
Let's take the opportunity to make the protection more robust, even in
Git versions that are technically not affected: instead of quietly
converting 'update = !command' to 'update = none', noisily treat it as
an error. Allowing the setting but treating it as meaning something
else was just confusing; users are better served by seeing the error
sooner. Forbidding the construct makes the semantics simpler and
means we can check for it in fsck (in a separate patch).
As a result, the submodule-config API cannot read this value from
.gitmodules under any circumstance, and we can declare with confidence
For security reasons, the '!command' form is not accepted
here.
Reported-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
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* maint-2.14: (28 commits)
Git 2.14.6
mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives"
mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters
unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors
quote-stress-test: offer to test quoting arguments for MSYS2 sh
t6130/t9350: prepare for stringent Win32 path validation
quote-stress-test: allow skipping some trials
quote-stress-test: accept arguments to test via the command-line
tests: add a helper to stress test argument quoting
mingw: fix quoting of arguments
Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories
protect_ntfs: turn on NTFS protection by default
path: also guard `.gitmodules` against NTFS Alternate Data Streams
is_ntfs_dotgit(): speed it up
mingw: disallow backslash characters in tree objects' file names
path: safeguard `.git` against NTFS Alternate Streams Accesses
clone --recurse-submodules: prevent name squatting on Windows
is_ntfs_dotgit(): only verify the leading segment
test-path-utils: offer to run a protectNTFS/protectHFS benchmark
...
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Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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While the only permitted drive letters for physical drives on Windows
are letters of the US-English alphabet, this restriction does not apply
to virtual drives assigned via `subst <letter>: <path>`.
To prevent targeted attacks against systems where "funny" drive letters
such as `1` or `!` are assigned, let's handle them as regular drive
letters on Windows.
This fixes CVE-2019-1351.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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On Windows, filenames cannot have trailing spaces or periods, when
opening such paths, they are stripped automatically. Read: you can open
the file `README` via the file name `README . . .`. This ambiguity can
be used in combination with other security bugs to cause e.g. remote
code execution during recursive clones. This patch series fixes that.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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This patch fixes a vulnerability in the Windows-specific code where a
submodule names ending in a backslash were quoted incorrectly, and that
bug could be abused to insert command-line parameters e.g. to `ssh` in a
recursive clone.
Note: this bug is Windows-only, as we have to construct a command line
for the process-to-spawn, unlike Linux/macOS, where `execv()` accepts an
already-split command line.
While at it, other quoting issues are fixed as well.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Recursive clones are currently affected by a vulnerability that is
caused by too-lax validation of submodule names.
This topic branch fixes that.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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This patch series makes it safe to use Git on Windows drives, even if
running on a mounted network share or within the Windows Subsystem for
Linux (WSL).
This topic branch addresses CVE-2019-1353.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Over a decade ago, in 25fe217b86c (Windows: Treat Windows style path
names., 2008-03-05), Git was taught to handle absolute Windows paths,
i.e. paths that start with a drive letter and a colon.
Unbeknownst to us, while drive letters of physical drives are limited to
letters of the English alphabet, there is a way to assign virtual drive
letters to arbitrary directories, via the `subst` command, which is
_not_ limited to English letters.
It is therefore possible to have absolute Windows paths of the form
`1:\what\the\hex.txt`. Even "better": pretty much arbitrary Unicode
letters can also be used, e.g. `ä:\tschibät.sch`.
While it can be sensibly argued that users who set up such funny drive
letters really seek adverse consequences, the Windows Operating System
is known to be a platform where many users are at the mercy of
administrators who have their very own idea of what constitutes a
reasonable setup.
Therefore, let's just make sure that such funny paths are still
considered absolute paths by Git, on Windows.
In addition to Unicode characters, pretty much any character is a valid
drive letter, as far as `subst` is concerned, even `:` and `"` or even a
space character. While it is probably the opposite of smart to use them,
let's safeguard `is_dos_drive_prefix()` against all of them.
Note: `[::1]:repo` is a valid URL, but not a valid path on Windows.
As `[` is now considered a valid drive letter, we need to be very
careful to avoid misinterpreting such a string as valid local path in
`url_is_local_not_ssh()`. To do that, we use the just-introduced
function `is_valid_path()` (which will label the string as invalid file
name because of the colon characters).
This fixes CVE-2019-1351.
Reported-by: Nicolas Joly <Nicolas.Joly@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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This patch series plugs an attack vector we had overlooked in our
December 2014 work on `core.protectNTFS`.
Essentially, the path `.git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/config` is interpreted as
`.git/config` when NTFS Alternate Data Streams are available (which they
are on Windows, and at least on network shares that are SMB-mounted on
macOS).
Needless to say: we don't want that.
In fact, we want to stay on the very safe side and not even special-case
the `$INDEX_ALLOCATION` stream type: let's just prevent Git from
touching _any_ explicitly specified Alternate Data Stream of `.git`.
In essence, we'll prevent Git from tracking, or writing to, any path
with a segment of the form `.git:<anything>`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When creating a directory on Windows whose path ends in a space or a
period (or chains thereof), the Win32 API "helpfully" trims those. For
example, `mkdir("abc ");` will return success, but actually create a
directory called `abc` instead.
This stems back to the DOS days, when all file names had exactly 8
characters plus exactly 3 characters for the file extension, and the
only way to have shorter names was by padding with spaces.
Sadly, this "helpful" behavior is a bit inconsistent: after a successful
`mkdir("abc ");`, a `mkdir("abc /def")` will actually _fail_ (because
the directory `abc ` does not actually exist).
Even if it would work, we now have a serious problem because a Git
repository could contain directories `abc` and `abc `, and on Windows,
they would be "merged" unintentionally.
As these paths are illegal on Windows, anyway, let's disallow any
accesses to such paths on that Operating System.
For practical reasons, this behavior is still guarded by the
config setting `core.protectNTFS`: it is possible (and at least two
regression tests make use of it) to create commits without involving the
worktree. In such a scenario, it is of course possible -- even on
Windows -- to create such file names.
Among other consequences, this patch disallows submodules' paths to end
in spaces on Windows (which would formerly have confused Git enough to
try to write into incorrect paths, anyway).
While this patch does not fix a vulnerability on its own, it prevents an
attack vector that was exploited in demonstrations of a number of
recently-fixed security bugs.
The regression test added to `t/t7417-submodule-path-url.sh` reflects
that attack vector.
Note that we have to adjust the test case "prevent git~1 squatting on
Windows" in `t/t7415-submodule-names.sh` because of a very subtle issue.
It tries to clone two submodules whose names differ only in a trailing
period character, and as a consequence their git directories differ in
the same way. Previously, when Git tried to clone the second submodule,
it thought that the git directory already existed (because on Windows,
when you create a directory with the name `b.` it actually creates `b`),
but with this patch, the first submodule's clone will fail because of
the illegal name of the git directory. Therefore, when cloning the
second submodule, Git will take a different code path: a fresh clone
(without an existing git directory). Both code paths fail to clone the
second submodule, both because the the corresponding worktree directory
exists and is not empty, but the error messages are worded differently.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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It is unfortunate that we need to quote arguments differently on
Windows, depending whether we build a command-line for MSYS2's `sh` or
for other Windows executables.
We already have a test helper to verify the latter, with this patch we
can also verify the former.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Certain characters are not admissible in file names on Windows, even if
Cygwin/MSYS2 (and therefore, Git for Windows' Bash) pretend that they
are, e.g. `:`, `<`, `>`, etc
Let's disallow those characters explicitly in Windows builds of Git.
Note: just like trailing spaces or periods, it _is_ possible on Windows
to create commits adding files with such illegal characters, as long as
the operation leaves the worktree untouched. To allow for that, we
continue to guard `is_valid_win32_path()` behind the config setting
`core.protectNTFS`, so that users _can_ continue to do that, as long as
they turn the protections off via that config setting.
Among other problems, this prevents Git from trying to write to an "NTFS
Alternate Data Stream" (which refers to metadata stored alongside a
file, under a special name: "<filename>:<stream-name>"). This fix
therefore also prevents an attack vector that was exploited in
demonstrations of a number of recently-fixed security bugs.
Further reading on illegal characters in Win32 filenames:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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A `git clone` will end with exit code 0 when `merged_entry()` returns a
positive value during a call of `unpack_trees()` to `traverse_trees()`.
The reason is that `unpack_trees()` will interpret a positive value not
to be an error.
The problem is, however, that `add_index_entry()` (which is called by
`merged_entry()` can report an error, and we really should fail the
entire clone in such a case.
Let's fix this problem, in preparation for a Windows-specific patch
disallowing `mkdir()` with directory names that contain a trailing space
(which is illegal on NTFS): we want `git clone` to abort when a path
cannot be checked out due to that condition.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When the, say, 93rd trial run fails, it is a good idea to have a way to
skip the first 92 trials and dig directly into the 93rd in a debugger.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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On Windows, file names cannot contain asterisks nor newline characters.
In an upcoming commit, we will make this limitation explicit,
disallowing even the creation of commits that introduce such file names.
However, in the test scripts touched by this patch, we _know_ that those
paths won't be checked out, so we _want_ to allow such file names.
Happily, the stringent path validation will be guarded via the
`core.protectNTFS` flag, so all we need to do is to force that flag off
temporarily.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When the stress test reported a problem with quoting certain arguments,
it is helpful to have a facility to play with those arguments in order
to find out whether variations of those arguments are affected, too.
Let's allow `test-run-command quote-stress-test -- <args>` to be used
for that purpose.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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On Windows, we have to do all the command-line argument quoting
ourselves. Worse: we have to have two versions of said quoting, one for
MSYS2 programs (which have their own dequoting rules) and the rest.
We care mostly about the rest, and to make sure that that works, let's
have a stress test that comes up with all kinds of awkward arguments,
verifying that a spawned sub-process receives those unharmed.
Signed-off-by: Garima Singh <garima.singh@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Currently it is technically possible to let a submodule's git
directory point right into the git dir of a sibling submodule.
Example: the git directories of two submodules with the names `hippo`
and `hippo/hooks` would be `.git/modules/hippo/` and
`.git/modules/hippo/hooks/`, respectively, but the latter is already
intended to house the former's hooks.
In most cases, this is just confusing, but there is also a (quite
contrived) attack vector where Git can be fooled into mistaking remote
content for file contents it wrote itself during a recursive clone.
Let's plug this bug.
To do so, we introduce the new function `validate_submodule_git_dir()`
which simply verifies that no git dir exists for any leading directories
of the submodule name (if there are any).
Note: this patch specifically continues to allow sibling modules names
of the form `core/lib`, `core/doc`, etc, as long as `core` is not a
submodule name.
This fixes CVE-2019-1387.
Reported-by: Nicolas Joly <Nicolas.Joly@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Back in the DOS days, in the FAT file system, file names always
consisted of a base name of length 8 plus a file extension of length 3.
Shorter file names were simply padded with spaces to the full 8.3
format.
Later, the FAT file system was taught to support _also_ longer names,
with an 8.3 "short name" as primary file name. While at it, the same
facility allowed formerly illegal file names, such as `.git` (empty base
names were not allowed), which would have the "short name" `git~1`
associated with it.
For backwards-compatibility, NTFS supports alternative 8.3 short
filenames, too, even if starting with Windows Vista, they are only
generated on the system drive by default.
We addressed the problem that the `.git/` directory can _also_ be
accessed via `git~1/` (when short names are enabled) in 2b4c6efc821
(read-cache: optionally disallow NTFS .git variants, 2014-12-16), i.e.
since Git v1.9.5, by introducing the config setting `core.protectNTFS`
and enabling it by default on Windows.
In the meantime, Windows 10 introduced the "Windows Subsystem for Linux"
(short: WSL), i.e. a way to run Linux applications/distributions in a
thinly-isolated subsystem on Windows (giving rise to many a "2016 is the
Year of Linux on the Desktop" jokes). WSL is getting increasingly
popular, also due to the painless way Linux application can operate
directly ("natively") on files on Windows' file system: the Windows
drives are mounted automatically (e.g. `C:` as `/mnt/c/`).
Taken together, this means that we now have to enable the safe-guards of
Git v1.9.5 also in WSL: it is possible to access a `.git` directory
inside `/mnt/c/` via the 8.3 name `git~1` (unless short name generation
was disabled manually). Since regular Linux distributions run in WSL,
this means we have to enable `core.protectNTFS` at least on Linux, too.
To enable Services for Macintosh in Windows NT to store so-called
resource forks, NTFS introduced "Alternate Data Streams". Essentially,
these constitute additional metadata that are connected to (and copied
with) their associated files, and they are accessed via pseudo file
names of the form `filename:<stream-name>:<stream-type>`.
In a recent patch, we extended `core.protectNTFS` to also protect
against accesses via NTFS Alternate Data Streams, e.g. to prevent
contents of the `.git/` directory to be "tracked" via yet another
alternative file name.
While it is not possible (at least by default) to access files via NTFS
Alternate Data Streams from within WSL, the defaults on macOS when
mounting network shares via SMB _do_ allow accessing files and
directories in that way. Therefore, we need to enable `core.protectNTFS`
on macOS by default, too, and really, on any Operating System that can
mount network shares via SMB/CIFS.
A couple of approaches were considered for fixing this:
1. We could perform a dynamic NTFS check similar to the `core.symlinks`
check in `init`/`clone`: instead of trying to create a symbolic link
in the `.git/` directory, we could create a test file and try to
access `.git/config` via 8.3 name and/or Alternate Data Stream.
2. We could simply "flip the switch" on `core.protectNTFS`, to make it
"on by default".
The obvious downside of 1. is that it won't protect worktrees that were
clone with a vulnerable Git version already. We considered patching code
paths that check out files to check whether we're running on an NTFS
system dynamically and persist the result in the repository-local config
setting `core.protectNTFS`, but in the end decided that this solution
would be too fragile, and too involved.
The obvious downside of 2. is that everybody will have to "suffer" the
performance penalty incurred from calling `is_ntfs_dotgit()` on every
path, even in setups where.
After the recent work to accelerate `is_ntfs_dotgit()` in most cases,
it looks as if the time spent on validating ten million random
file names increases only negligibly (less than 20ms, well within the
standard deviation of ~50ms). Therefore the benefits outweigh the cost.
Another downside of this is that paths that might have been acceptable
previously now will be forbidden. Realistically, though, this is an
improvement because public Git hosters already would reject any `git
push` that contains such file names.
Note: There might be a similar problem mounting HFS+ on Linux. However,
this scenario has been considered unlikely and in light of the cost (in
the aforementioned benchmark, `core.protectHFS = true` increased the
time from ~440ms to ~610ms), it was decided _not_ to touch the default
of `core.protectHFS`.
This change addresses CVE-2019-1353.
Reported-by: Nicolas Joly <Nicolas.Joly@microsoft.com>
Helped-by: Garima Singh <garima.singh@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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We just safe-guarded `.git` against NTFS Alternate Data Stream-related
attack vectors, and now it is time to do the same for `.gitmodules`.
Note: In the added regression test, we refrain from verifying all kinds
of variations between short names and NTFS Alternate Data Streams: as
the new code disallows _all_ Alternate Data Streams of `.gitmodules`, it
is enough to test one in order to know that all of them are guarded
against.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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We need to be careful to follow proper quoting rules. For example, if an
argument contains spaces, we have to quote them. Double-quotes need to
be escaped. Backslashes need to be escaped, but only if they are
followed by a double-quote character.
We need to be _extra_ careful to consider the case where an argument
ends in a backslash _and_ needs to be quoted: in this case, we append a
double-quote character, i.e. the backslash now has to be escaped!
The current code, however, fails to recognize that, and therefore can
turn an argument that ends in a single backslash into a quoted argument
that now ends in an escaped double-quote character. This allows
subsequent command-line parameters to be split and part of them being
mistaken for command-line options, e.g. through a maliciously-crafted
submodule URL during a recursive clone.
Technically, we would not need to quote _all_ arguments which end in a
backslash _unless_ the argument needs to be quoted anyway. For example,
`test\` would not need to be quoted, while `test \` would need to be.
To keep the code simple, however, and therefore easier to reason about
and ensure its correctness, we now _always_ quote an argument that ends
in a backslash.
This addresses CVE-2019-1350.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Previously, this function was written without focusing on speed,
intending to make reviewing the code as easy as possible, to avoid any
bugs in this critical code.
Turns out: we can do much better on both accounts. With this patch, we
make it as fast as this developer can make it go:
- We avoid the call to `is_dir_sep()` and make all the character
comparisons explicit.
- We avoid the cost of calling `strncasecmp()` and unroll the test for
`.git` and `git~1`, not even using `tolower()` because it is faster to
compare against two constant values.
- We look for `.git` and `.git~1` first thing, and return early if not
found.
- We also avoid calling a separate function for detecting chains of
spaces and periods.
Each of these improvements has a noticeable impact on the speed of
`is_ntfs_dotgit()`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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