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authorJohannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>2019-09-05 11:27:53 (GMT)
committerJohannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>2019-12-05 14:37:06 (GMT)
commitd2c84dad1c88f40906799bc879f70b965efd8ba6 (patch)
tree0f5ade52bd955bf983830a41972c6307ae6fa8d4
parentcc756edda63769cf6d7acc99e6ad3a9cbb5dc3ec (diff)
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mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods
When creating a directory on Windows whose path ends in a space or a period (or chains thereof), the Win32 API "helpfully" trims those. For example, `mkdir("abc ");` will return success, but actually create a directory called `abc` instead. This stems back to the DOS days, when all file names had exactly 8 characters plus exactly 3 characters for the file extension, and the only way to have shorter names was by padding with spaces. Sadly, this "helpful" behavior is a bit inconsistent: after a successful `mkdir("abc ");`, a `mkdir("abc /def")` will actually _fail_ (because the directory `abc ` does not actually exist). Even if it would work, we now have a serious problem because a Git repository could contain directories `abc` and `abc `, and on Windows, they would be "merged" unintentionally. As these paths are illegal on Windows, anyway, let's disallow any accesses to such paths on that Operating System. For practical reasons, this behavior is still guarded by the config setting `core.protectNTFS`: it is possible (and at least two regression tests make use of it) to create commits without involving the worktree. In such a scenario, it is of course possible -- even on Windows -- to create such file names. Among other consequences, this patch disallows submodules' paths to end in spaces on Windows (which would formerly have confused Git enough to try to write into incorrect paths, anyway). While this patch does not fix a vulnerability on its own, it prevents an attack vector that was exploited in demonstrations of a number of recently-fixed security bugs. The regression test added to `t/t7417-submodule-path-url.sh` reflects that attack vector. Note that we have to adjust the test case "prevent git~1 squatting on Windows" in `t/t7415-submodule-names.sh` because of a very subtle issue. It tries to clone two submodules whose names differ only in a trailing period character, and as a consequence their git directories differ in the same way. Previously, when Git tried to clone the second submodule, it thought that the git directory already existed (because on Windows, when you create a directory with the name `b.` it actually creates `b`), but with this patch, the first submodule's clone will fail because of the illegal name of the git directory. Therefore, when cloning the second submodule, Git will take a different code path: a fresh clone (without an existing git directory). Both code paths fail to clone the second submodule, both because the the corresponding worktree directory exists and is not empty, but the error messages are worded differently. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
-rw-r--r--compat/mingw.c57
-rw-r--r--compat/mingw.h11
-rw-r--r--git-compat-util.h4
-rw-r--r--read-cache.c3
-rw-r--r--t/helper/test-path-utils.c17
-rwxr-xr-xt/t0060-path-utils.sh14
-rwxr-xr-xt/t7415-submodule-names.sh2
-rwxr-xr-xt/t7417-submodule-path-url.sh17
8 files changed, 123 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/compat/mingw.c b/compat/mingw.c
index 8b6fa0d..17b4da1 100644
--- a/compat/mingw.c
+++ b/compat/mingw.c
@@ -333,6 +333,12 @@ int mingw_mkdir(const char *path, int mode)
{
int ret;
wchar_t wpath[MAX_PATH];
+
+ if (!is_valid_win32_path(path)) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (xutftowcs_path(wpath, path) < 0)
return -1;
ret = _wmkdir(wpath);
@@ -345,13 +351,18 @@ int mingw_open (const char *filename, int oflags, ...)
{
va_list args;
unsigned mode;
- int fd;
+ int fd, create = (oflags & (O_CREAT | O_EXCL)) == (O_CREAT | O_EXCL);
wchar_t wfilename[MAX_PATH];
va_start(args, oflags);
mode = va_arg(args, int);
va_end(args);
+ if (!is_valid_win32_path(filename)) {
+ errno = create ? EINVAL : ENOENT;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (filename && !strcmp(filename, "/dev/null"))
filename = "nul";
@@ -413,6 +424,11 @@ FILE *mingw_fopen (const char *filename, const char *otype)
int hide = needs_hiding(filename);
FILE *file;
wchar_t wfilename[MAX_PATH], wotype[4];
+ if (!is_valid_win32_path(filename)) {
+ int create = otype && strchr(otype, 'w');
+ errno = create ? EINVAL : ENOENT;
+ return NULL;
+ }
if (filename && !strcmp(filename, "/dev/null"))
filename = "nul";
if (xutftowcs_path(wfilename, filename) < 0 ||
@@ -435,6 +451,11 @@ FILE *mingw_freopen (const char *filename, const char *otype, FILE *stream)
int hide = needs_hiding(filename);
FILE *file;
wchar_t wfilename[MAX_PATH], wotype[4];
+ if (!is_valid_win32_path(filename)) {
+ int create = otype && strchr(otype, 'w');
+ errno = create ? EINVAL : ENOENT;
+ return NULL;
+ }
if (filename && !strcmp(filename, "/dev/null"))
filename = "nul";
if (xutftowcs_path(wfilename, filename) < 0 ||
@@ -2106,6 +2127,40 @@ static void setup_windows_environment(void)
setenv("TERM", "cygwin", 1);
}
+int is_valid_win32_path(const char *path)
+{
+ int preceding_space_or_period = 0, i = 0, periods = 0;
+
+ if (!protect_ntfs)
+ return 1;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ char c = *(path++);
+ switch (c) {
+ case '\0':
+ case '/': case '\\':
+ /* cannot end in ` ` or `.`, except for `.` and `..` */
+ if (preceding_space_or_period &&
+ (i != periods || periods > 2))
+ return 0;
+ if (!c)
+ return 1;
+
+ i = periods = preceding_space_or_period = 0;
+ continue;
+ case '.':
+ periods++;
+ /* fallthru */
+ case ' ':
+ preceding_space_or_period = 1;
+ i++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ preceding_space_or_period = 0;
+ i++;
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Disable MSVCRT command line wildcard expansion (__getmainargs called from
* mingw startup code, see init.c in mingw runtime).
diff --git a/compat/mingw.h b/compat/mingw.h
index e03aecf..8c49c1d 100644
--- a/compat/mingw.h
+++ b/compat/mingw.h
@@ -429,6 +429,17 @@ int mingw_offset_1st_component(const char *path);
#endif
/**
+ * Verifies that the given path is a valid one on Windows.
+ *
+ * In particular, path segments are disallowed which end in a period or a
+ * space (except the special directories `.` and `..`).
+ *
+ * Returns 1 upon success, otherwise 0.
+ */
+int is_valid_win32_path(const char *path);
+#define is_valid_path(path) is_valid_win32_path(path)
+
+/**
* Converts UTF-8 encoded string to UTF-16LE.
*
* To support repositories with legacy-encoded file names, invalid UTF-8 bytes
diff --git a/git-compat-util.h b/git-compat-util.h
index 6cb3c2f..e587ac4 100644
--- a/git-compat-util.h
+++ b/git-compat-util.h
@@ -370,6 +370,10 @@ static inline int git_offset_1st_component(const char *path)
#define offset_1st_component git_offset_1st_component
#endif
+#ifndef is_valid_path
+#define is_valid_path(path) 1
+#endif
+
#ifndef find_last_dir_sep
static inline char *git_find_last_dir_sep(const char *path)
{
diff --git a/read-cache.c b/read-cache.c
index bde1e70..771171c 100644
--- a/read-cache.c
+++ b/read-cache.c
@@ -847,6 +847,9 @@ int verify_path(const char *path, unsigned mode)
if (has_dos_drive_prefix(path))
return 0;
+ if (!is_valid_path(path))
+ return 0;
+
goto inside;
for (;;) {
if (!c)
diff --git a/t/helper/test-path-utils.c b/t/helper/test-path-utils.c
index 16d8e68..8b3ce07 100644
--- a/t/helper/test-path-utils.c
+++ b/t/helper/test-path-utils.c
@@ -386,6 +386,23 @@ int cmd_main(int argc, const char **argv)
if (argc > 1 && !strcmp(argv[1], "protect_ntfs_hfs"))
return !!protect_ntfs_hfs_benchmark(argc - 1, argv + 1);
+ if (argc > 1 && !strcmp(argv[1], "is_valid_path")) {
+ int res = 0, expect = 1, i;
+
+ for (i = 2; i < argc; i++)
+ if (!strcmp("--not", argv[i]))
+ expect = 0;
+ else if (expect != is_valid_path(argv[i]))
+ res = error("'%s' is%s a valid path",
+ argv[i], expect ? " not" : "");
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "'%s' is%s a valid path\n",
+ argv[i], expect ? "" : " not");
+
+ return !!res;
+ }
+
fprintf(stderr, "%s: unknown function name: %s\n", argv[0],
argv[1] ? argv[1] : "(there was none)");
return 1;
diff --git a/t/t0060-path-utils.sh b/t/t0060-path-utils.sh
index 2b8589e..1171e0b 100755
--- a/t/t0060-path-utils.sh
+++ b/t/t0060-path-utils.sh
@@ -440,4 +440,18 @@ test_expect_success 'match .gitmodules' '
.gitmodules,:\$DATA
'
+test_expect_success MINGW 'is_valid_path() on Windows' '
+ test-path-utils is_valid_path \
+ win32 \
+ "win32 x" \
+ ../hello.txt \
+ \
+ --not \
+ "win32 " \
+ "win32 /x " \
+ "win32." \
+ "win32 . ." \
+ .../hello.txt
+'
+
test_done
diff --git a/t/t7415-submodule-names.sh b/t/t7415-submodule-names.sh
index 7c65e7a..5141ff4 100755
--- a/t/t7415-submodule-names.sh
+++ b/t/t7415-submodule-names.sh
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ test_expect_success MINGW 'prevent git~1 squatting on Windows' '
) &&
test_must_fail git -c core.protectNTFS=false \
clone --recurse-submodules squatting squatting-clone 2>err &&
- test_i18ngrep "directory not empty" err &&
+ test_i18ngrep -e "directory not empty" -e "not an empty directory" err &&
! grep gitdir squatting-clone/d/a/git~2
'
diff --git a/t/t7417-submodule-path-url.sh b/t/t7417-submodule-path-url.sh
index 638293f..fad9e20 100755
--- a/t/t7417-submodule-path-url.sh
+++ b/t/t7417-submodule-path-url.sh
@@ -17,4 +17,21 @@ test_expect_success 'clone rejects unprotected dash' '
test_i18ngrep ignoring err
'
+test_expect_success MINGW 'submodule paths disallows trailing spaces' '
+ git init super &&
+ test_must_fail git -C super submodule add ../upstream "sub " &&
+
+ : add "sub", then rename "sub" to "sub ", the hard way &&
+ git -C super submodule add ../upstream sub &&
+ tree=$(git -C super write-tree) &&
+ git -C super ls-tree $tree >tree &&
+ sed "s/sub/sub /" <tree >tree.new &&
+ tree=$(git -C super mktree <tree.new) &&
+ commit=$(echo with space | git -C super commit-tree $tree) &&
+ git -C super update-ref refs/heads/master $commit &&
+
+ test_must_fail git clone --recurse-submodules super dst 2>err &&
+ test_i18ngrep "sub " err
+'
+
test_done