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author | Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com> | 2022-07-14 21:28:01 (GMT) |
---|---|---|
committer | Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 2022-07-14 22:08:29 (GMT) |
commit | 8d1a7448206e11cdea657c35b04cc49db39be933 (patch) | |
tree | adb883132f48ef4f809f7ed2fd4b633850998ee9 /setup.c | |
parent | 6061601d9f1f1c95da5f9304c319218f7cc3ec75 (diff) | |
download | git-8d1a7448206e11cdea657c35b04cc49db39be933.zip git-8d1a7448206e11cdea657c35b04cc49db39be933.tar.gz git-8d1a7448206e11cdea657c35b04cc49db39be933.tar.bz2 |
setup.c: create `safe.bareRepository`
There is a known social engineering attack that takes advantage of the
fact that a working tree can include an entire bare repository,
including a config file. A user could run a Git command inside the bare
repository thinking that the config file of the 'outer' repository would
be used, but in reality, the bare repository's config file (which is
attacker-controlled) is used, which may result in arbitrary code
execution. See [1] for a fuller description and deeper discussion.
A simple mitigation is to forbid bare repositories unless specified via
`--git-dir` or `GIT_DIR`. In environments that don't use bare
repositories, this would be minimally disruptive.
Create a config variable, `safe.bareRepository`, that tells Git whether
or not to die() when working with a bare repository. This config is an
enum of:
- "all": allow all bare repositories (this is the default)
- "explicit": only allow bare repositories specified via --git-dir
or GIT_DIR.
If we want to protect users from such attacks by default, neither value
will suffice - "all" provides no protection, but "explicit" is
impractical for bare repository users. A more usable default would be to
allow only non-embedded bare repositories ([2] contains one such
proposal), but detecting if a repository is embedded is potentially
non-trivial, so this work is not implemented in this series.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/git/kl6lsfqpygsj.fsf@chooglen-macbookpro.roam.corp.google.com
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/git/5b969c5e-e802-c447-ad25-6acc0b784582@github.com
Signed-off-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'setup.c')
-rw-r--r-- | setup.c | 57 |
1 files changed, 56 insertions, 1 deletions
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ static int inside_git_dir = -1; static int inside_work_tree = -1; static int work_tree_config_is_bogus; +enum allowed_bare_repo { + ALLOWED_BARE_REPO_EXPLICIT = 0, + ALLOWED_BARE_REPO_ALL, +}; static struct startup_info the_startup_info; struct startup_info *startup_info = &the_startup_info; @@ -1160,6 +1164,46 @@ static int ensure_valid_ownership(const char *gitfile, return data.is_safe; } +static int allowed_bare_repo_cb(const char *key, const char *value, void *d) +{ + enum allowed_bare_repo *allowed_bare_repo = d; + + if (strcasecmp(key, "safe.bareRepository")) + return 0; + + if (!strcmp(value, "explicit")) { + *allowed_bare_repo = ALLOWED_BARE_REPO_EXPLICIT; + return 0; + } + if (!strcmp(value, "all")) { + *allowed_bare_repo = ALLOWED_BARE_REPO_ALL; + return 0; + } + return -1; +} + +static enum allowed_bare_repo get_allowed_bare_repo(void) +{ + enum allowed_bare_repo result = ALLOWED_BARE_REPO_ALL; + git_protected_config(allowed_bare_repo_cb, &result); + return result; +} + +static const char *allowed_bare_repo_to_string( + enum allowed_bare_repo allowed_bare_repo) +{ + switch (allowed_bare_repo) { + case ALLOWED_BARE_REPO_EXPLICIT: + return "explicit"; + case ALLOWED_BARE_REPO_ALL: + return "all"; + default: + BUG("invalid allowed_bare_repo %d", + allowed_bare_repo); + } + return NULL; +} + enum discovery_result { GIT_DIR_NONE = 0, GIT_DIR_EXPLICIT, @@ -1169,7 +1213,8 @@ enum discovery_result { GIT_DIR_HIT_CEILING = -1, GIT_DIR_HIT_MOUNT_POINT = -2, GIT_DIR_INVALID_GITFILE = -3, - GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP = -4 + GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP = -4, + GIT_DIR_DISALLOWED_BARE = -5, }; /* @@ -1297,6 +1342,8 @@ static enum discovery_result setup_git_directory_gently_1(struct strbuf *dir, } if (is_git_directory(dir->buf)) { + if (get_allowed_bare_repo() == ALLOWED_BARE_REPO_EXPLICIT) + return GIT_DIR_DISALLOWED_BARE; if (!ensure_valid_ownership(NULL, NULL, dir->buf)) return GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP; strbuf_addstr(gitdir, "."); @@ -1443,6 +1490,14 @@ const char *setup_git_directory_gently(int *nongit_ok) } *nongit_ok = 1; break; + case GIT_DIR_DISALLOWED_BARE: + if (!nongit_ok) { + die(_("cannot use bare repository '%s' (safe.bareRepository is '%s')"), + dir.buf, + allowed_bare_repo_to_string(get_allowed_bare_repo())); + } + *nongit_ok = 1; + break; case GIT_DIR_NONE: /* * As a safeguard against setup_git_directory_gently_1 returning |