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authorHans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com>2020-03-04 11:48:04 (GMT)
committerJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>2020-03-15 16:46:28 (GMT)
commit67948981983b336eab2fa7e6a0e125d529391dfc (patch)
tree6365d127be157a4ae8061186e0a156cce7497014 /log-tree.c
parentf1e3df316992d32b17ee27385e4c644ef7b66cc1 (diff)
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gpg-interface: prefer check_signature() for GPG verification
This commit refactors the use of verify_signed_buffer() outside of gpg-interface.c to use check_signature() instead. It also turns verify_signed_buffer() into a file-local function since it's now only invoked internally by check_signature(). There were previously two globally scoped functions used in different parts of Git to perform GPG signature verification: verify_signed_buffer() and check_signature(). Now only check_signature() is used. The verify_signed_buffer() function doesn't guard against duplicate signatures as described by Michał Górny [1]. Instead it only ensures a non-erroneous exit code from GPG and the presence of at least one GOODSIG status field. This stands in contrast with check_signature() that returns an error if more than one signature is encountered. The lower degree of verification makes the use of verify_signed_buffer() problematic if callers don't parse and validate the various parts of the GPG status message themselves. And processing these messages seems like a task that should be reserved to gpg-interface.c with the function check_signature(). Furthermore, the use of verify_signed_buffer() makes it difficult to introduce new functionality that relies on the content of the GPG status lines. Now all operations that does signature verification share a single entry point to gpg-interface.c. This makes it easier to propagate changed or additional functionality in GPG signature verification to all parts of Git, without having odd edge-cases that don't perform the same degree of verification. [1] https://dev.gentoo.org/~mgorny/articles/attack-on-git-signature-verification.html Signed-off-by: Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'log-tree.c')
-rw-r--r--log-tree.c34
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/log-tree.c b/log-tree.c
index 5425ae9..f1ac5a6 100644
--- a/log-tree.c
+++ b/log-tree.c
@@ -449,22 +449,21 @@ static void show_signature(struct rev_info *opt, struct commit *commit)
{
struct strbuf payload = STRBUF_INIT;
struct strbuf signature = STRBUF_INIT;
- struct strbuf gpg_output = STRBUF_INIT;
+ struct signature_check sigc = { 0 };
int status;
if (parse_signed_commit(commit, &payload, &signature) <= 0)
goto out;
- status = verify_signed_buffer(payload.buf, payload.len,
- signature.buf, signature.len,
- &gpg_output, NULL);
- if (status && !gpg_output.len)
- strbuf_addstr(&gpg_output, "No signature\n");
-
- show_sig_lines(opt, status, gpg_output.buf);
+ status = check_signature(payload.buf, payload.len, signature.buf,
+ signature.len, &sigc);
+ if (status && !sigc.gpg_output)
+ show_sig_lines(opt, status, "No signature\n");
+ else
+ show_sig_lines(opt, status, sigc.gpg_output);
+ signature_check_clear(&sigc);
out:
- strbuf_release(&gpg_output);
strbuf_release(&payload);
strbuf_release(&signature);
}
@@ -497,8 +496,9 @@ static int show_one_mergetag(struct commit *commit,
struct object_id oid;
struct tag *tag;
struct strbuf verify_message;
+ struct signature_check sigc = { 0 };
int status, nth;
- size_t payload_size, gpg_message_offset;
+ size_t payload_size;
hash_object_file(the_hash_algo, extra->value, extra->len,
type_name(OBJ_TAG), &oid);
@@ -520,19 +520,19 @@ static int show_one_mergetag(struct commit *commit,
else
strbuf_addf(&verify_message,
"parent #%d, tagged '%s'\n", nth + 1, tag->tag);
- gpg_message_offset = verify_message.len;
payload_size = parse_signature(extra->value, extra->len);
status = -1;
if (extra->len > payload_size) {
/* could have a good signature */
- if (!verify_signed_buffer(extra->value, payload_size,
- extra->value + payload_size,
- extra->len - payload_size,
- &verify_message, NULL))
- status = 0; /* good */
- else if (verify_message.len <= gpg_message_offset)
+ status = check_signature(extra->value, payload_size,
+ extra->value + payload_size,
+ extra->len - payload_size, &sigc);
+ if (sigc.gpg_output)
+ strbuf_addstr(&verify_message, sigc.gpg_output);
+ else
strbuf_addstr(&verify_message, "No signature\n");
+ signature_check_clear(&sigc);
/* otherwise we couldn't verify, which is shown as bad */
}