gpg.program:: Use this custom program instead of "`gpg`" found on `$PATH` when making or verifying a PGP signature. The program must support the same command-line interface as GPG, namely, to verify a detached signature, "`gpg --verify $signature - <$file`" is run, and the program is expected to signal a good signature by exiting with code 0, and to generate an ASCII-armored detached signature, the standard input of "`gpg -bsau $key`" is fed with the contents to be signed, and the program is expected to send the result to its standard output. gpg.format:: Specifies which key format to use when signing with `--gpg-sign`. Default is "openpgp". Other possible values are "x509", "ssh". gpg..program:: Use this to customize the program used for the signing format you chose. (see `gpg.program` and `gpg.format`) `gpg.program` can still be used as a legacy synonym for `gpg.openpgp.program`. The default value for `gpg.x509.program` is "gpgsm" and `gpg.ssh.program` is "ssh-keygen". gpg.minTrustLevel:: Specifies a minimum trust level for signature verification. If this option is unset, then signature verification for merge operations require a key with at least `marginal` trust. Other operations that perform signature verification require a key with at least `undefined` trust. Setting this option overrides the required trust-level for all operations. Supported values, in increasing order of significance: + * `undefined` * `never` * `marginal` * `fully` * `ultimate` gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand: This command that will be run when user.signingkey is not set and a ssh signature is requested. On successful exit a valid ssh public key is expected in the first line of its output. To automatically use the first available key from your ssh-agent set this to "ssh-add -L". gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile:: A file containing ssh public keys which you are willing to trust. The file consists of one or more lines of principals followed by an ssh public key. e.g.: user1@example.com,user2@example.com ssh-rsa AAAAX1... See ssh-keygen(1) "ALLOWED SIGNERS" for details. The principal is only used to identify the key and is available when verifying a signature. + SSH has no concept of trust levels like gpg does. To be able to differentiate between valid signatures and trusted signatures the trust level of a signature verification is set to `fully` when the public key is present in the allowedSignersFile. Otherwise the trust level is `undefined` and git verify-commit/tag will fail. + This file can be set to a location outside of the repository and every developer maintains their own trust store. A central repository server could generate this file automatically from ssh keys with push access to verify the code against. In a corporate setting this file is probably generated at a global location from automation that already handles developer ssh keys. + A repository that only allows signed commits can store the file in the repository itself using a path relative to the top-level of the working tree. This way only committers with an already valid key can add or change keys in the keyring. + Using a SSH CA key with the cert-authority option (see ssh-keygen(1) "CERTIFICATES") is also valid. gpg.ssh.revocationFile:: Either a SSH KRL or a list of revoked public keys (without the principal prefix). See ssh-keygen(1) for details. If a public key is found in this file then it will always be treated as having trust level "never" and signatures will show as invalid.