diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | sha1dc/sha1.c | 30 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sha1dc/sha1.h | 6 |
2 files changed, 27 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/sha1dc/sha1.c b/sha1dc/sha1.c index 3dff80a..facea1b 100644 --- a/sha1dc/sha1.c +++ b/sha1dc/sha1.c @@ -35,15 +35,33 @@ #ifdef SHA1DC_BIGENDIAN #undef SHA1DC_BIGENDIAN #endif -#if (!defined SHA1DC_FORCE_LITTLEENDIAN) && \ - ((defined(__BYTE_ORDER) && (__BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN)) || \ - (defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && (__BYTE_ORDER__ == __BIG_ENDIAN__)) || \ - defined(_BIG_ENDIAN) || defined(__BIG_ENDIAN__) || defined(__ARMEB__) || defined(__THUMBEB__) || defined(__AARCH64EB__) || \ - defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(SHA1DC_FORCE_BIGENDIAN)) +#if (defined(_BYTE_ORDER) || defined(__BYTE_ORDER) || defined(__BYTE_ORDER__)) + +#if ((defined(_BYTE_ORDER) && (_BYTE_ORDER == _BIG_ENDIAN)) || \ + (defined(__BYTE_ORDER) && (__BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN)) || \ + (defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) && (__BYTE_ORDER__ == __BIG_ENDIAN__)) ) #define SHA1DC_BIGENDIAN +#endif + +#else + +#if (defined(_BIG_ENDIAN) || defined(__BIG_ENDIAN) || defined(__BIG_ENDIAN__) || \ + defined(__ARMEB__) || defined(__THUMBEB__) || defined(__AARCH64EB__) || \ + defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || \ + defined(__sparc)) +#define SHA1DC_BIGENDIAN +#endif -#endif /*ENDIANNESS SELECTION*/ +#endif + +#if (defined(SHA1DC_FORCE_LITTLEENDIAN) && defined(SHA1DC_BIGENDIAN)) +#undef SHA1DC_BIGENDIAN +#endif +#if (defined(SHA1DC_FORCE_BIGENDIAN) && !defined(SHA1DC_BIGENDIAN)) +#define SHA1DC_BIGENDIAN +#endif +/*ENDIANNESS SELECTION*/ #if (defined SHA1DC_FORCE_UNALIGNED_ACCESS || \ defined(__amd64__) || defined(__amd64) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__x86_64) || \ diff --git a/sha1dc/sha1.h b/sha1dc/sha1.h index a0ff5d1..1e4e94b 100644 --- a/sha1dc/sha1.h +++ b/sha1dc/sha1.h @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ void SHA1DCInit(SHA1_CTX*); Function to enable safe SHA-1 hashing: Collision attacks are thwarted by hashing a detected near-collision block 3 times. Think of it as extending SHA-1 from 80-steps to 240-steps for such blocks: - The best collision attacks against SHA-1 have complexity about 2^60, - thus for 240-steps an immediate lower-bound for the best cryptanalytic attacks would be 2^180. - An attacker would be better off using a generic birthday search of complexity 2^80. + The best collision attacks against SHA-1 have complexity about 2^60, + thus for 240-steps an immediate lower-bound for the best cryptanalytic attacks would be 2^180. + An attacker would be better off using a generic birthday search of complexity 2^80. Enabling safe SHA-1 hashing will result in the correct SHA-1 hash for messages where no collision attack was detected, but it will result in a different SHA-1 hash for messages where a collision attack was detected. |