pretty: fix out-of-bounds read when parsing invalid padding format

An out-of-bounds read can be triggered when parsing an incomplete
padding format string passed via `--pretty=format` or in Git archives
when files are marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute.

This bug exists since we have introduced support for truncating output
via the `trunc` keyword a7f01c6b4d (pretty: support truncating in %>, %<
and %><, 2013-04-19). Before this commit, we used to find the end of the
formatting string by using strchr(3P). This function returns a `NULL`
pointer in case the character in question wasn't found. The subsequent
check whether any character was found thus simply checked the returned
pointer. After the commit we switched to strcspn(3P) though, which only
returns the offset to the first found character or to the trailing NUL
byte. As the end pointer is now computed by adding the offset to the
start pointer it won't be `NULL` anymore, and as a consequence the check
doesn't do anything anymore.

The out-of-bounds data that is being read can in fact end up in the
formatted string. As a consequence, it is possible to leak memory
contents either by calling git-log(1) or via git-archive(1) when any of
the archived files is marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute.

    ==10888==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000000398 at pc 0x7f0356047cb2 bp 0x7fff3ffb95d0 sp 0x7fff3ffb8d78
    READ of size 1 at 0x602000000398 thread T0
        #0 0x7f0356047cb1 in __interceptor_strchrnul /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725
        #1 0x563b7cec9a43 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:417
        #2 0x563b7cda7060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
        #3 0x563b7cda8d0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
        #4 0x563b7cca04c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
        #5 0x563b7cca36ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
        #6 0x563b7c927ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
        #7 0x563b7c92835b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
        #8 0x563b7c92b1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
        #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466
        #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788
        #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
        #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57
        #14 0x7f0355e3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
        #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
        #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115

    0x602000000398 is located 0 bytes to the right of 8-byte region [0x602000000390,0x602000000398)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7f0356072faa in __interceptor_strdup /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439
        #1 0x563b7cf7317c in xstrdup wrapper.c:39
        #2 0x563b7cd9a06a in save_user_format pretty.c:40
        #3 0x563b7cd9b3e5 in get_commit_format pretty.c:173
        #4 0x563b7ce54ea0 in handle_revision_opt revision.c:2456
        #5 0x563b7ce597c9 in setup_revisions revision.c:2850
        #6 0x563b7c9269e0 in cmd_log_init_finish builtin/log.c:269
        #7 0x563b7c927362 in cmd_log_init builtin/log.c:348
        #8 0x563b7c92b193 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:882
        #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466
        #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788
        #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
        #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57
        #14 0x7f0355e3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
        #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
        #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115

    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 in __interceptor_strchrnul
    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
      0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd
      0x0c047fff8030: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd
      0x0c047fff8040: fa fa 00 07 fa fa 03 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00
      0x0c047fff8050: fa fa 00 01 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 01
      0x0c047fff8060: fa fa 00 06 fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa 05 fa
    =>0x0c047fff8070: fa fa 00[fa]fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd
      0x0c047fff8080: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa
      0x0c047fff8090: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c047fff80a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c047fff80b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c047fff80c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
      Addressable:           00
      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
      Heap left redzone:       fa
      Freed heap region:       fd
      Stack left redzone:      f1
      Stack mid redzone:       f2
      Stack right redzone:     f3
      Stack after return:      f5
      Stack use after scope:   f8
      Global redzone:          f9
      Global init order:       f6
      Poisoned by user:        f7
      Container overflow:      fc
      Array cookie:            ac
      Intra object redzone:    bb
      ASan internal:           fe
      Left alloca redzone:     ca
      Right alloca redzone:    cb
    ==10888==ABORTING

Fix this bug by checking whether `end` points at the trailing NUL byte.
Add a test which catches this out-of-bounds read and which demonstrates
that we used to write out-of-bounds data into the formatted message.

Reported-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de>
Original-patch-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c
index 692a638..d55b886 100644
--- a/pretty.c
+++ b/pretty.c
@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ static size_t parse_padding_placeholder(const char *placeholder,
 		const char *end = start + strcspn(start, ",)");
 		char *next;
 		int width;
-		if (!end || end == start)
+		if (!*end || end == start)
 			return 0;
 		width = strtol(start, &next, 10);
 		if (next == start || width == 0)