pretty: fix out-of-bounds write caused by integer overflow

When using a padding specifier in the pretty format passed to git-log(1)
we need to calculate the string length in several places. These string
lengths are stored in `int`s though, which means that these can easily
overflow when the input lengths exceeds 2GB. This can ultimately lead to
an out-of-bounds write when these are used in a call to memcpy(3P):

        ==8340==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f1ec62f97fe at pc 0x7f2127e5f427 bp 0x7ffd3bd63de0 sp 0x7ffd3bd63588
    WRITE of size 1 at 0x7f1ec62f97fe thread T0
        #0 0x7f2127e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827
        #1 0x5628e96aa605 in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1762
        #2 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
        #3 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
        #4 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
        #5 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
        #6 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
        #7 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
        #8 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
        #9 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
        #10 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
        #11 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466
        #12 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #13 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788
        #14 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
        #15 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57
        #16 0x7f2127c3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
        #17 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
        #18 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115

    0x7f1ec62f97fe is located 2 bytes to the left of 4831838265-byte region [0x7f1ec62f9800,0x7f1fe62f9839)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7f2127ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85
        #1 0x5628e98774d4 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136
        #2 0x5628e97cb01c in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99
        #3 0x5628e97ccd42 in strbuf_addchars strbuf.c:327
        #4 0x5628e96aa55c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1761
        #5 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
        #6 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
        #7 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
        #8 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
        #9 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
        #10 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
        #11 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
        #12 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
        #13 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
        #14 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466
        #15 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #16 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788
        #17 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
        #18 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57
        #19 0x7f2127c3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
        #20 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
        #21 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115

    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy
    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
      0x0fe458c572a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0fe458c572b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0fe458c572c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0fe458c572d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0fe458c572e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    =>0x0fe458c572f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa]
      0x0fe458c57300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0fe458c57310: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0fe458c57320: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0fe458c57330: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0fe458c57340: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
      Addressable:           00
      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
      Heap left redzone:       fa
      Freed heap region:       fd
      Stack left redzone:      f1
      Stack mid redzone:       f2
      Stack right redzone:     f3
      Stack after return:      f5
      Stack use after scope:   f8
      Global redzone:          f9
      Global init order:       f6
      Poisoned by user:        f7
      Container overflow:      fc
      Array cookie:            ac
      Intra object redzone:    bb
      ASan internal:           fe
      Left alloca redzone:     ca
      Right alloca redzone:    cb
    ==8340==ABORTING

The pretty format can also be used in `git archive` operations via the
`export-subst` attribute. So this is what in our opinion makes this a
critical issue in the context of Git forges which allow to download an
archive of user supplied Git repositories.

Fix this vulnerability by using `size_t` instead of `int` to track the
string lengths. Add tests which detect this vulnerability when Git is
compiled with the address sanitizer.

Reported-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com>
Original-patch-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com>
Modified-by: Taylor  Blau <me@ttalorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

1 files changed, 6 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/pretty.c b/pretty.c
index 7a7708a..a1a0149 100644
--- a/pretty.c
+++ b/pretty.c
@@ -1473,7 +1473,9 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
 				    struct format_commit_context *c)
 {
 	struct strbuf local_sb = STRBUF_INIT;
-	int total_consumed = 0, len, padding = c->padding;
+	size_t total_consumed = 0;
+	int len, padding = c->padding;
+
 	if (padding < 0) {
 		const char *start = strrchr(sb->buf, '\n');
 		int occupied;
@@ -1485,7 +1487,7 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
 	}
 	while (1) {
 		int modifier = *placeholder == 'C';
-		int consumed = format_commit_one(&local_sb, placeholder, c);
+		size_t consumed = format_commit_one(&local_sb, placeholder, c);
 		total_consumed += consumed;
 
 		if (!modifier)
@@ -1551,7 +1553,7 @@ static size_t format_and_pad_commit(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
 		}
 		strbuf_addbuf(sb, &local_sb);
 	} else {
-		int sb_len = sb->len, offset = 0;
+		size_t sb_len = sb->len, offset = 0;
 		if (c->flush_type == flush_left)
 			offset = padding - len;
 		else if (c->flush_type == flush_both)
@@ -1574,8 +1576,7 @@ static size_t format_commit_item(struct strbuf *sb, /* in UTF-8 */
 				 const char *placeholder,
 				 void *context)
 {
-	int consumed;
-	size_t orig_len;
+	size_t consumed, orig_len;
 	enum {
 		NO_MAGIC,
 		ADD_LF_BEFORE_NON_EMPTY,