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authorJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>2014-08-21 23:45:30 (GMT)
committerJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>2014-09-17 21:27:40 (GMT)
commitb89363e4a5277038629491f8765c0598f366326c (patch)
tree254c02373450167a86f33afdeac9cd851859ca00 /builtin/receive-pack.c
parent9be89160e7382a88e56a02bcf38f4694dd6542d6 (diff)
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signed push: fortify against replay attacks
In order to prevent a valid push certificate for pushing into an repository from getting replayed in a different push operation, send a nonce string from the receive-pack process and have the signer include it in the push certificate. The receiving end uses an HMAC hash of the path to the repository it serves and the current time stamp, hashed with a secret seed (the secret seed does not have to be per-repository but can be defined in /etc/gitconfig) to generate the nonce, in order to ensure that a random third party cannot forge a nonce that looks like it originated from it. The original nonce is exported as GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE for the hooks to examine and match against the value on the "nonce" header in the certificate to notice a replay, but returned "nonce" header in the push certificate is examined by receive-pack and the result is exported as GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS, whose value would be "OK" if the nonce recorded in the certificate matches what we expect, so that the hooks can more easily check. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'builtin/receive-pack.c')
-rw-r--r--builtin/receive-pack.c132
1 files changed, 124 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/builtin/receive-pack.c b/builtin/receive-pack.c
index 431af39..91d1a6f 100644
--- a/builtin/receive-pack.c
+++ b/builtin/receive-pack.c
@@ -48,10 +48,17 @@ static void *head_name_to_free;
static int sent_capabilities;
static int shallow_update;
static const char *alt_shallow_file;
-static int accept_push_cert = 1;
static struct strbuf push_cert = STRBUF_INIT;
static unsigned char push_cert_sha1[20];
static struct signature_check sigcheck;
+static const char *push_cert_nonce;
+static const char *cert_nonce_seed;
+
+static const char *NONCE_UNSOLICITED = "UNSOLICITED";
+static const char *NONCE_BAD = "BAD";
+static const char *NONCE_MISSING = "MISSING";
+static const char *NONCE_OK = "OK";
+static const char *nonce_status;
static enum deny_action parse_deny_action(const char *var, const char *value)
{
@@ -135,10 +142,8 @@ static int receive_pack_config(const char *var, const char *value, void *cb)
return 0;
}
- if (strcmp(var, "receive.acceptpushcert") == 0) {
- accept_push_cert = git_config_bool(var, value);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (strcmp(var, "receive.certnonceseed") == 0)
+ return git_config_string(&cert_nonce_seed, var, value);
return git_default_config(var, value, cb);
}
@@ -157,8 +162,8 @@ static void show_ref(const char *path, const unsigned char *sha1)
"report-status delete-refs side-band-64k quiet");
if (prefer_ofs_delta)
strbuf_addstr(&cap, " ofs-delta");
- if (accept_push_cert)
- strbuf_addstr(&cap, " push-cert");
+ if (push_cert_nonce)
+ strbuf_addf(&cap, " push-cert=%s", push_cert_nonce);
strbuf_addf(&cap, " agent=%s", git_user_agent_sanitized());
packet_write(1, "%s %s%c%s\n",
sha1_to_hex(sha1), path, 0, cap.buf);
@@ -271,6 +276,110 @@ static int copy_to_sideband(int in, int out, void *arg)
return 0;
}
+#define HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE 64
+
+static void hmac_sha1(unsigned char out[20],
+ const char *key_in, size_t key_len,
+ const char *text, size_t text_len)
+{
+ unsigned char key[HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char k_ipad[HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char k_opad[HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ int i;
+ git_SHA_CTX ctx;
+
+ /* RFC 2104 2. (1) */
+ memset(key, '\0', HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE < key_len) {
+ git_SHA1_Init(&ctx);
+ git_SHA1_Update(&ctx, key_in, key_len);
+ git_SHA1_Final(key, &ctx);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(key, key_in, key_len);
+ }
+
+ /* RFC 2104 2. (2) & (5) */
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(key); i++) {
+ k_ipad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x36;
+ k_opad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x5c;
+ }
+
+ /* RFC 2104 2. (3) & (4) */
+ git_SHA1_Init(&ctx);
+ git_SHA1_Update(&ctx, k_ipad, sizeof(k_ipad));
+ git_SHA1_Update(&ctx, text, text_len);
+ git_SHA1_Final(out, &ctx);
+
+ /* RFC 2104 2. (6) & (7) */
+ git_SHA1_Init(&ctx);
+ git_SHA1_Update(&ctx, k_opad, sizeof(k_opad));
+ git_SHA1_Update(&ctx, out, sizeof(out));
+ git_SHA1_Final(out, &ctx);
+}
+
+static char *prepare_push_cert_nonce(const char *path, unsigned long stamp)
+{
+ struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
+ unsigned char sha1[20];
+
+ strbuf_addf(&buf, "%s:%lu", path, stamp);
+ hmac_sha1(sha1, buf.buf, buf.len, cert_nonce_seed, strlen(cert_nonce_seed));;
+ strbuf_release(&buf);
+
+ /* RFC 2104 5. HMAC-SHA1-80 */
+ strbuf_addf(&buf, "%lu-%.*s", stamp, 20, sha1_to_hex(sha1));
+ return strbuf_detach(&buf, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NEEDSWORK: reuse find_commit_header() from jk/commit-author-parsing
+ * after dropping "_commit" from its name and possibly moving it out
+ * of commit.c
+ */
+static char *find_header(const char *msg, size_t len, const char *key)
+{
+ int key_len = strlen(key);
+ const char *line = msg;
+
+ while (line && line < msg + len) {
+ const char *eol = strchrnul(line, '\n');
+
+ if ((msg + len <= eol) || line == eol)
+ return NULL;
+ if (line + key_len < eol &&
+ !memcmp(line, key, key_len) && line[key_len] == ' ') {
+ int offset = key_len + 1;
+ return xmemdupz(line + offset, (eol - line) - offset);
+ }
+ line = *eol ? eol + 1 : NULL;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *check_nonce(const char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ char *nonce = find_header(buf, len, "nonce");
+ const char *retval = NONCE_BAD;
+
+ if (!nonce) {
+ retval = NONCE_MISSING;
+ goto leave;
+ } else if (!push_cert_nonce) {
+ retval = NONCE_UNSOLICITED;
+ goto leave;
+ } else if (!strcmp(push_cert_nonce, nonce)) {
+ retval = NONCE_OK;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ /* returned nonce MUST match what we gave out earlier */
+ retval = NONCE_BAD;
+
+leave:
+ free(nonce);
+ return retval;
+}
+
static void prepare_push_cert_sha1(struct child_process *proc)
{
static int already_done;
@@ -305,6 +414,7 @@ static void prepare_push_cert_sha1(struct child_process *proc)
strbuf_release(&gpg_output);
strbuf_release(&gpg_status);
+ nonce_status = check_nonce(push_cert.buf, bogs);
}
if (!is_null_sha1(push_cert_sha1)) {
argv_array_pushf(&env, "GIT_PUSH_CERT=%s", sha1_to_hex(push_cert_sha1));
@@ -313,7 +423,10 @@ static void prepare_push_cert_sha1(struct child_process *proc)
argv_array_pushf(&env, "GIT_PUSH_CERT_KEY=%s",
sigcheck.key ? sigcheck.key : "");
argv_array_pushf(&env, "GIT_PUSH_CERT_STATUS=%c", sigcheck.result);
-
+ if (push_cert_nonce) {
+ argv_array_pushf(&env, "GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE=%s", push_cert_nonce);
+ argv_array_pushf(&env, "GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE_STATUS=%s", nonce_status);
+ }
proc->env = env.argv;
}
}
@@ -1296,6 +1409,8 @@ int cmd_receive_pack(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
die("'%s' does not appear to be a git repository", dir);
git_config(receive_pack_config, NULL);
+ if (cert_nonce_seed)
+ push_cert_nonce = prepare_push_cert_nonce(dir, time(NULL));
if (0 <= transfer_unpack_limit)
unpack_limit = transfer_unpack_limit;
@@ -1340,5 +1455,6 @@ int cmd_receive_pack(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
packet_flush(1);
sha1_array_clear(&shallow);
sha1_array_clear(&ref);
+ free((void *)push_cert_nonce);
return 0;
}