path: root/builtin/pack-objects.c
diff options
authorNicolas Pitre <>2010-10-22 20:26:23 (GMT)
committerJunio C Hamano <>2010-10-22 21:59:58 (GMT)
commit71064a956b25ef519eab340e364d0bc0e786bd11 (patch)
treeab8c6463b30d9d24b18a64838c4b29d5ad63ec1a /builtin/pack-objects.c
parent8a90438506d3b7c8ef8bd802b7ed10c1f12da1d0 (diff)
make pack-objects a bit more resilient to repo corruption
Right now, packing valid objects could fail when creating a thin pack simply because a pack edge object used as a preferred base is corrupted. Since preferred base objects are not strictly needed to produce a valid pack, let's not consider the inability to read them as a fatal error. Delta compression may well be attempted against other objects in the search window. To avoid warning storms (we are in the inner loop of the delta search window) a warning is emitted only on the first occurrence. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <>
Diffstat (limited to 'builtin/pack-objects.c')
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/builtin/pack-objects.c b/builtin/pack-objects.c
index f8eba53..3cbeb29 100644
--- a/builtin/pack-objects.c
+++ b/builtin/pack-objects.c
@@ -1298,9 +1298,23 @@ static int try_delta(struct unpacked *trg, struct unpacked *src,
src->data = read_sha1_file(src_entry->idx.sha1, &type, &sz);
- if (!src->data)
+ if (!src->data) {
+ if (src_entry->preferred_base) {
+ static int warned = 0;
+ if (!warned++)
+ warning("object %s cannot be read",
+ sha1_to_hex(src_entry->idx.sha1));
+ /*
+ * Those objects are not included in the
+ * resulting pack. Be resilient and ignore
+ * them if they can't be read, in case the
+ * pack could be created nevertheless.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
die("object %s cannot be read",
+ }
if (sz != src_size)
die("object %s inconsistent object length (%lu vs %lu)",
sha1_to_hex(src_entry->idx.sha1), sz, src_size);