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authorThomas Ackermann <th.acker@arcor.de>2021-02-05 18:22:28 (GMT)
committerJunio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>2021-02-05 19:57:10 (GMT)
commit1d18997007de8c0403bb7187d32d1d1d3787220b (patch)
treed92b8a933907c66a474d6e8be77fa28b5e833cd0 /Documentation/technical
parentcc9f0916bdf9ad2481c66ac607e0f961c4282b3f (diff)
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doc hash-function-transition: move rationale upwards
Move rationale for new hash function to beginning of document so that it appears before the concrete move to SHA-256 is described. Remove some of the details about SHA-1 weaknesses and add references to the details on how the new hash function was chosen instead. Signed-off-by: Thomas Ackermann <th.acker@arcor.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/technical')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/technical/hash-function-transition.txt76
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 42 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/technical/hash-function-transition.txt b/Documentation/technical/hash-function-transition.txt
index 5ff9ee0..0c4cb98 100644
--- a/Documentation/technical/hash-function-transition.txt
+++ b/Documentation/technical/hash-function-transition.txt
@@ -33,16 +33,9 @@ researchers. On 23 February 2017 the SHAttered attack
Git v2.13.0 and later subsequently moved to a hardened SHA-1
implementation by default, which isn't vulnerable to the SHAttered
-attack.
+attack, but SHA-1 is still weak.
-Thus Git has in effect already migrated to a new hash that isn't SHA-1
-and doesn't share its vulnerabilities, its new hash function just
-happens to produce exactly the same output for all known inputs,
-except two PDFs published by the SHAttered researchers, and the new
-implementation (written by those researchers) claims to detect future
-cryptanalytic collision attacks.
-
-Regardless, it's considered prudent to move past any variant of SHA-1
+Thus it's considered prudent to move past any variant of SHA-1
to a new hash. There's no guarantee that future attacks on SHA-1 won't
be published in the future, and those attacks may not have viable
mitigations.
@@ -57,6 +50,38 @@ SHA-1 still possesses the other properties such as fast object lookup
and safe error checking, but other hash functions are equally suitable
that are believed to be cryptographically secure.
+Choice of Hash
+--------------
+The hash to replace the hardened SHA-1 should be stronger than SHA-1
+was: we would like it to be trustworthy and useful in practice for at
+least 10 years.
+
+Some other relevant properties:
+
+1. A 256-bit hash (long enough to match common security practice; not
+ excessively long to hurt performance and disk usage).
+
+2. High quality implementations should be widely available (e.g., in
+ OpenSSL and Apple CommonCrypto).
+
+3. The hash function's properties should match Git's needs (e.g. Git
+ requires collision and 2nd preimage resistance and does not require
+ length extension resistance).
+
+4. As a tiebreaker, the hash should be fast to compute (fortunately
+ many contenders are faster than SHA-1).
+
+There were several contenders for a successor hash to SHA-1, including
+SHA-256, SHA-512/256, SHA-256x16, K12, and BLAKE2bp-256.
+
+In late 2018 the project picked SHA-256 as its successor hash.
+
+See 0ed8d8da374 (doc hash-function-transition: pick SHA-256 as
+NewHash, 2018-08-04) and numerous mailing list threads at the time,
+particularly the one starting at
+https://lore.kernel.org/git/20180609224913.GC38834@genre.crustytoothpaste.net/
+for more information.
+
Goals
-----
1. The transition to SHA-256 can be done one local repository at a time.
@@ -601,39 +626,6 @@ example:
git --output-format=sha1 log abac87a^{sha1}..f787cac^{sha256}
-Choice of Hash
---------------
-In early 2005, around the time that Git was written, Xiaoyun Wang,
-Yiqun Lisa Yin, and Hongbo Yu announced an attack finding SHA-1
-collisions in 2^69 operations. In August they published details.
-Luckily, no practical demonstrations of a collision in full SHA-1 were
-published until 10 years later, in 2017.
-
-Git v2.13.0 and later subsequently moved to a hardened SHA-1
-implementation by default that mitigates the SHAttered attack, but
-SHA-1 is still believed to be weak.
-
-The hash to replace this hardened SHA-1 should be stronger than SHA-1
-was: we would like it to be trustworthy and useful in practice for at
-least 10 years.
-
-Some other relevant properties:
-
-1. A 256-bit hash (long enough to match common security practice; not
- excessively long to hurt performance and disk usage).
-
-2. High quality implementations should be widely available (e.g., in
- OpenSSL and Apple CommonCrypto).
-
-3. The hash function's properties should match Git's needs (e.g. Git
- requires collision and 2nd preimage resistance and does not require
- length extension resistance).
-
-4. As a tiebreaker, the hash should be fast to compute (fortunately
- many contenders are faster than SHA-1).
-
-We choose SHA-256.
-
Transition plan
---------------
Some initial steps can be implemented independently of one another: