diff options
author | Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de> | 2021-09-10 20:07:39 (GMT) |
---|---|---|
committer | Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 2021-09-10 21:15:52 (GMT) |
commit | facca53ac3c2e8a5e2a4fe54c9c15de656c72de1 (patch) | |
tree | b04500593afeff42f4746949b99d6694dfe95b88 /Documentation/config/gpg.txt | |
parent | 4838f62c8caffbfe5d7d39cad4e8aeb2a2d57da8 (diff) | |
download | git-facca53ac3c2e8a5e2a4fe54c9c15de656c72de1.zip git-facca53ac3c2e8a5e2a4fe54c9c15de656c72de1.tar.gz git-facca53ac3c2e8a5e2a4fe54c9c15de656c72de1.tar.bz2 |
ssh signing: verify signatures using ssh-keygen
To verify a ssh signature we first call ssh-keygen -Y find-principal to
look up the signing principal by their public key from the
allowedSignersFile. If the key is found then we do a verify. Otherwise
we only validate the signature but can not verify the signers identity.
Verification uses the gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile (see ssh-keygen(1) "ALLOWED
SIGNERS") which contains valid public keys and a principal (usually
user@domain). Depending on the environment this file can be managed by
the individual developer or for example generated by the central
repository server from known ssh keys with push access. This file is usually
stored outside the repository, but if the repository only allows signed
commits/pushes, the user might choose to store it in the repository.
To revoke a key put the public key without the principal prefix into
gpg.ssh.revocationKeyring or generate a KRL (see ssh-keygen(1)
"KEY REVOCATION LISTS"). The same considerations about who to trust for
verification as with the allowedSignersFile apply.
Using SSH CA Keys with these files is also possible. Add
"cert-authority" as key option between the principal and the key to mark
it as a CA and all keys signed by it as valid for this CA.
See "CERTIFICATES" in ssh-keygen(1).
Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/config/gpg.txt')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/config/gpg.txt | 35 |
1 files changed, 35 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt index 9b95dd2..51a756b 100644 --- a/Documentation/config/gpg.txt +++ b/Documentation/config/gpg.txt @@ -39,3 +39,38 @@ gpg.ssh.defaultKeyCommand: signature is requested. On successful exit a valid ssh public key is expected in the first line of its output. To automatically use the first available key from your ssh-agent set this to "ssh-add -L". + +gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile:: + A file containing ssh public keys which you are willing to trust. + The file consists of one or more lines of principals followed by an ssh + public key. + e.g.: user1@example.com,user2@example.com ssh-rsa AAAAX1... + See ssh-keygen(1) "ALLOWED SIGNERS" for details. + The principal is only used to identify the key and is available when + verifying a signature. ++ +SSH has no concept of trust levels like gpg does. To be able to differentiate +between valid signatures and trusted signatures the trust level of a signature +verification is set to `fully` when the public key is present in the allowedSignersFile. +Therefore to only mark fully trusted keys as verified set gpg.minTrustLevel to `fully`. +Otherwise valid but untrusted signatures will still verify but show no principal +name of the signer. ++ +This file can be set to a location outside of the repository and every developer +maintains their own trust store. A central repository server could generate this +file automatically from ssh keys with push access to verify the code against. +In a corporate setting this file is probably generated at a global location +from automation that already handles developer ssh keys. ++ +A repository that only allows signed commits can store the file +in the repository itself using a path relative to the top-level of the working tree. +This way only committers with an already valid key can add or change keys in the keyring. ++ +Using a SSH CA key with the cert-authority option +(see ssh-keygen(1) "CERTIFICATES") is also valid. + +gpg.ssh.revocationFile:: + Either a SSH KRL or a list of revoked public keys (without the principal prefix). + See ssh-keygen(1) for details. + If a public key is found in this file then it will always be treated + as having trust level "never" and signatures will show as invalid. |